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It's been a few days now since we began a conversation that addresses the issue of how frustrated some number of LBGT voters are with the Democratic Party this cycle; this because they find themselves either frustrated at the lack of progress on the civil rights issues that matter to them, or because they see both the Democratic and Republican Parties as unreliable partners in the struggle to assure equal rights for all.
In an effort to practice some actual journalism, I assembled a version of an online "focus group" at The Bilerico Project ("daily adventures in LBGTQ"), with the goal of gathering some opinions on this subject in the actual words of those frustrated voters.
Part One of this story focused on "stating the problem", and today we'll take on Part Two: in this environment, with Election Day staring us in the face, what is an LBGT voter to do?
As before, there are a variety of opinions, including a very informative comment I was able to obtain from a genuine Member of Congress, Patrick Murphy of Pennsylvania's 8th District, and that means until the very end you won't hear much from me, except to help "set the stage" for the comments that follow.
It is about a week before early voting begins for a bunch of us around the country, and that means this may be one of the last times I have to convince you that, frustrated progressive or not, you better get your butt to a ballot box or a mail-in envelope this November, because it really does matter.
Now I could give you a bunch of "what ifs" to make my point, or I could remind you how we spent all summer watching oil gush into the Gulf, and how that came to be...but, instead, it's "Even More Current Event Day", and we're going to visit Hungary for a extremely real-world reminder of what can go wrong when the environmental cops are considered just too much of a burden by the environmental robbers-and if today's story doesn't scare you to death, I don't know what will.
It ain't Texas, but we will surely visit a Red River Valley...and you surely won't like what you're gonna see.
Consider this post a placeholder for the camera-ready moment three years from now when Romney casts his NH-Primary ballot for himself in Wolfeboro.
For Mittens, whom I predict, along with lots of others, has the best shot at the 2012 nomination, state borders are for the little people:
Despite selling his only home in Massachusetts, former Gov. Mitt Romney (R) voted last month in the state's Republican primary to choose a candidate for Sen. Ted Kennedy's seat using his son's address and has already mailed in a ballot for the Jan. 19 special election.
Romney spokesman Eric Fehrnstrom said despite selling his home in Belmont last year, Romney never gave up his Massachusetts residency. When he is in the state he stays with his son Tagg.
Isn't that nice? He has a home here in Wolfeboro, and in other states, but because he has relatives in Massachusetts, he can vote there too.
(Insert winger conspiracy theory snark here about socialists bussed up north by the cartload to vote illegally in our presidential primary.)
I'm surprised this story has received so little traction. Aren't there, um, laws against voting in a state in which you are not a resident? (Update: Paul, who knows about these things, says not illegal. Tacky, given maintaining residency at a relative's house while having so many others of his own, but not illegal.)
You're too stoopid to vote in our First-in-the-Nation Primary.
If you don't like it, move to one of the nine other states, like Maine, that entertain such radical ideas about voting.
But seriously for a minute: as a practical matter, this hurts, not insignificantly in my view, the long-term prospects of the health of our primary.
If you lowered the age a year for the primary, you would have a much* higher rate of high-school students eligible to vote on primary day. This would make voting much* more prominent and visible at school, which would have the effect of making it one of those permanent traditions that populate student life at school. That in turn, would create a larger number of people more likely to be both a) life-long voters, and b) voters with a vested interest in preserving our primary.
*Adding: duh - I'm stoopid too. If they need to be 18 by the time of the GE the following November, then this doesn't actually mean a whole lot more students in school with voting power. So maybe not a huge impact on student traditions. That said, I still firmly believe 17-ers are mature enough, independent enough, and smart enough to make considered a choice for a POTUS candidate on primary day.
In the town hall at Harts Location, Ron Zager begins the countdown, while Town Moderator Les Schoof is ready to bang the gavel to begin voting. Town Clerk, Marion Varney is ready to cast the first vote.
Here's a list of questions that both new and experienced voters may have about the voting process. I'm a poll worker, so these are educated - though not official - answers. Where I can, I point to official stuff, though. (I've also tried to mark my partisan commentary in italics to separate it from statements of accepted law.)
Clicking on a hot-linked question will bring you to a comment that addresses it. (The comments are collected in an older diary; I've been adding new comments / answers to it today.) Then click the browser 'Back' button to return here.
(This is awesome. Midnight viz! - promoted by Dean Barker)
Location, that is. :)
NH law allows towns with fewer than 100 residents to open the polls at midnight and close them as soon as all registered voters have voted. Harts Location began midnight voting in 1948, the first town to actually do so. Dixville Notch gets the lion's share of attention because Harts stopped midnight voting in 1964. They resumed the practice in 1996. Starting at 12.01 am on Tuesday, the voters of Harts Location (home of State Rep. Ed Butler) will be casting their ballots.
For perhaps the first time, there will be a Democratic visibility at the polls in Harts Location this year. Some dedicated locals and some of our fabulous visiting volunteers will be braving the chill to do a visibility and watch REALLY small town democracy in action.
WMUR will be in Dixville Notch. I'll be in Harts Location with a camera. Stay tuned!
Historically New Hampshire's state representatives have been allocated among its cities and individual small towns. Originally any town with at least 150 voters got a state rep and the legislature grew as needed; later that was raised to 600; still later the legislature was capped at 400.
In 1962 the U. S. Supreme Court ruled in Baker v. Carr that state and local elections must use districts proportional to population. ("One man / one vote." "Little US Senates" were not allowed.)
In 2002, after a divided legislature failed to agree on a reapportionment plan, the state Supreme Court implemented one. In 2004 the legislature replaced it with its own. In both new plans smaller towns were frequently grouped together to form multi-member groups. A town that had enough voters for 1.5 state reps would be combined with a town with enough votes for 2.5 state reps, and together as a single district they would elect 4.
Districts lumped together in this manner are called "floterial."
Petition of Appeal, noted violations and weaknesses in NH recount cited below
Petition of Appeal to the Ballot Law Commission
c/o Office of the Secretary of State, William Gardner
State House
Concord, New Hampshire 03301
by Albert Howard, Republican candidate for President of the United States
New Hampshire Primary Election of January 8th, 2008
Date: February 15, 2008
Petitioner: Albert Howard, Pro Se 710 Apple St. Ann Arbor, MI 48105-1750
Subject of Petition: Appeal of results of the Presidential Primary recount completed February 11, 2008; examination of contested ballots in that recount.
Relief Requested: That the Ballot Law Commission and the Secretary of State's office disclaim any opinion on the accuracy of the Presidential primary election AND the statewide Republican recount because checks and balances to maintain the integrity of the ballots and the total counts were either not followed, or not in place.
Introduction:
New Hampshire has the distinct honor of having the first Presidential primary in the country and has always been viewed as a model state because of its election system and methodology of holding elections in an open, transparent fashion. I, for one, thank you for keeping the tradition of being one of the few states in the country that still has a paper ballot for every person who votes. Your standards for transparency and support of the democratic process are admirable and much appreciated.
I ask that you view the following petition as an opportunity to improve your procedures and policies. The scrutiny of election observers has brought with it a chance to correct areas of vulnerabilities and potential breakdowns and holes in the system. As a candidate I am requesting you work with me and together we can open up meaningful dialogue to bring better procedures and amend areas that need attention based on my experience and in consultation with many experienced and dedicated election integrity advocates. <!--break-->
If this Commission chooses to follow through and act on my questions, requests and recommendations, I am certain it will make New Hampshire's electoral system even stronger and an even better leader for other states to follow.
This Petition is not about me. This Petition represents the requests of the people this Ballot Law Commission represents. Every person who voted in this Primary election wants to know that their vote was accepted and counted as cast. They want to have no doubt about the integrity of New Hampshire's election process.
I am asking for the opportunity to work with you, to initiate an open, meaningful dialogue regarding how we can bring further reform to an already good system. My goal is to walk away from this process with both sides feeling that meaningful agreement was reached for all parties. and that together we have identified and addressed the few weak spots.
New Hampshire has a long and proud election tradition. Transparency is a key component of this tradition and the remedy suggestions included in this Petition are intended to enhance that tradition.
PETITION:
Petitioner contends that the results of the statewide Republican recount are potentially invalid due to violation of various state election laws, procedures of the Ballot Law Commission, and written procedures governing the handling and securing of the ballots. Furthermore, discrepancies shown between the results of those ballots counted by hand versus those counted by Diebold optical scan counters (see Appendix 1), together with violations of HAVA requirements, indicate a high risk and opportunity for manipulation of ballots and vote totals, thereby invalidating the results of both the Primary election and the recount.
Examples of violations of statutes or procedures follows. The sequence, in accordance with that outlined in the statutes of the Ballot Law Commission, will be the violation, the remedy requested, and the citation of the appropriate statutes or regulations. Exhibits illustrating most of the violations will follow.
VIOLATION #1: Machine failures were handled improperly -- and possibly altered the outcome of the election.
Fact: Election Day problems with the Diebold Optical Scan machines clearly demonstrated that many of the machines malfunctioned during the Primary election. Do we have any way of knowing that the new memory cards had been examined and approved by the Ballot Law Commission (BLC) as required? Did local election officials allow illegal substitution of election devices that had not been examined and certified? Shouldn't these machines have been declared unfit for service as dictated by state law?
Town clerks have told Dori Smith, a journalist from Connecticut, that memory cards were "switched out" in some towns by LHS employees, counter to state election laws, calling into question the chain of custody of these critical "electronic ballot boxes".
Secretary of States MANUAL P. 34-35: The seal for the memory card should be replaced for each election when the newly programmed card is re-inserted into the machine for the pre-election testing of the card. The card should remain sealed until after the recount period ends following the election. The seal for the cover of the machine should only be broken by LHS when it services the machine. The cover must be resealed by the clerk when the LHS technician has completed any service work. Each time any of the two seals are broken and the machine is resealed it should be documented in the log.
Exhibit A documents the reports by LHS of (at least some of) the day's problems. A few examples are included below from reports received by LHS and forwarded to the Secretary of State's office.
Town of Manchester, two examples:
"solution listed (What happened here? This was the 3rd machine to be replaced that day in this location.)
Problem: P/U 3rd bad machine per John S."
"Problem: Machine taking ballots but counter not incrementing
Solution: Swap to spare machine to reburn a new card."
(What happened to the votes on the first machine and first memory card?
Does "reburn a new card" mean the memory card could have been illegally reprogrammed?)
Town of Barnstead:
"Problem: Ballots rejecting a lot, even during test. They did not call (?)
Solution: Told them I would have someone bring a new machine. They said no - It was working"
(What really happened here? Improper testing or a machine failing a test should have disqualified the machine from usage in an election. State statute VI. cites as a misdemeanor violation a person knowingly violating testing procedures and/or ignoring a machine failing testing.)
REMEDIAL ACTION REQUESTED: Some states have approved their equipment conditionally, so that investigations such as this would be paid by the vendor, in this case Diebold. As well, the New Hampshire statutes could be tightened so that, just as LHS must bear the cost of an invalid recount due to an employee's failure to properly program and test LHS' machines (RSA 656:42: V), LHS could as well be obliged to reimburse all costs related to investigation of their procedures. In the case of this Violation, it would mean that they would bear responsibility for investigating the accountability for every memory card
Their records and their doors must also be open to you for all testing, all maintenance, programming, bookkeeping, etc. The State, perhaps the Office of the Secretary of State or the BLC with the addition of a few citizen election activists should be welcome at all times to review/witness their work, their procedures, their books, etc.
An inquiry should be undertaken immediately for accountability of each memory card used in the Primary election, as well as the whereabouts and the sequence of events surrounding all memory cards used, including all delivered cards, all cards found to be problematic on Election Day, any substitute cards, "reburned" cards, and any unused cards delivered to the jurisdictions. Results of inquiry to be delivered to Petitioner.
I, as Petitioner, pursuant to RSA 656:42, request the opportunity to inspect the offices of LHS along with at least two computer technical experts of my choosing. (RSA 656:42, Section IV: Each person described in paragraph III shall designate, in writing, an agent for service of all process, including, but not limited to summonses, writs, orders, petitions, and subpoenas, and shall agree in writing that the Attorney General, in conjunction with any election investigation, may inspect its records, machines or other devices, and premises.)
I also request a full report of every visit by an LHS-related technician to a jurisdiction on January 8th, 2008 and ask that this report be compiled and examined as part of this inquiry. In the meantime, we are requesting that the Secretary of State consider sending out an order that all voting machines used in the State be impounded and vote totals NOT BE CLEARED until this formal inquiry is completed. I further request that no ballots or other election materials be destroyed prior to the 22 month waiting period as mandated by federal law. Several of the boxes of ballots received at the State Archive Building for the recount were marked: "Destroy November 2009" and these must be corrected to "2010." See Exhibit A.
CITATIONS:
656:41 Approval by Ballot Law Commission. The Ballot Law Commission shall act as a board to examine voting machines and devices for computerized casting and counting of ballots. ... Any voting machine or device that is altered must be re-approved before it is used in any election in this state. For the purposes of this section, a machine shall be considered altered if any mechanical or electronic part, hardware, software, or programming has been altered.
RSA 656:42 III. Any company, partnership, proprietorship, or other person, wherever located, which supplies, maintains, or programs voting machines which are used in elections in New Hampshire is subject to regulation by this state. (The following amendment to RSA 659:42 will take effect January 1, 2007)
RSA 659:42 Tampering with Voting Machines. Whoever shall tamper with or injure or attempt to injure any voting machine or device for the computerized casting and counting of ballots to be used or being used in an election or whoever shall prevent or attempt to prevent the correct operation of such machine or device or whoever shall tamper with software used in the casting or counting of ballots or design such software so as to cause incorrect tabulation of the ballots or any unauthorized person who shall make or have in his or her possession a key to a voting machine to be used or being used in an election shall be guilty of a class B felony if a natural person or guilty of a felony if any other person.
Secretary of State Manual page 34 - 35: The seal for the memory card should be replaced for each election when the newly programmed card is re-inserted into the machine for the pre-election testing of the card. The card should remain sealed until after the recount period ends following the election. The seal for the cover of the machine should only be broken by LHS when it services the machine. The cover must be resealed by the clerk when the LHS technician has completed any service work. Each time any of the two seals are broken and the machine is resealed it should be documented in the appropriate log.
Bal 604.02 Zeroing and Sealing Machines. (b) When a voting machine or device has been prepared for election, it shall be locked against voting and sealed and the keys shall be retained by the designated election officials. After the voting machine has been transferred to the polling place, it shall be the duty of the designated election official to provide protection against molestation, tampering or injury to the machines or devices.
Bal 606.04 Damaged Machines. In the event that any voting machine or device used i n any voting district during the time the polls are open, become damaged or disabled so as to render it inoperative in whole or in part, the election officials shall forthwith if possible, substitute a perfect machine for the damaged one. At the close of the polls, the votes shown on the counters of each machine shall be added together in ascertaining the results of the election. In the event that no other machine can be prepared forthwith for use at such election and the damaged one cannot be repaired in time, the provisions of RSA 658:35 shall apply.
VIOLATION # 2: Machine failures render equipment non-compliant with HAVA regulations.
Fact: HAVA requires that the error rate of machines used be no greater than one error in 500,000 ballot positions. In one of the most recent tests, at the University of Connecticut, the Diebold Precinct-Based Optical Scan Accuvote 1.94W system (AV OS), demonstrated a failure rate of roughly 3.4 %. This puts New Hampshire in an unfortunate situation and the integrity of its election results in question. I urge the Ballot Law Commission and the Secretary of State's office to seriously consider restoring elections utilizing 100% hand counted paper ballots. The fundamentals are in place for a meaningful and transparent election. The Diebold Optical Scan equipment you currently use is indeed problematic due to its proven vulnerabilities and inaccuracies. Diebold itself issued a Product Advisory Note about this machine on January 25, 2008 describing a known failure. http://www.votersunite.org/inf...
See Exhibit B for articles describing the serious vulnerabilities and high error rate for the Diebold Optical Scanner.
REMEDIAL ACTION REQUESTED: The very best thing New Hampshire could do is decertify the current equipment and find alterative means of vote counting. I strongly recommend hand counting all of the ballots. New Hampshire has established such an excellent system for community vote-counting, and the hand count method - especially the sort and stack method as was used for the recounts --that has time and time again proven to be the most accurate and by far the least costly method of counting citizens' votes.
CITATIONS:
HAVA 301(a)(5) references the rate in the VSS - FEC Voting System Standards: Error rates: The error rate of the voting system in counting ballots (determined by taking into account only those errors which are attributable to the voting system and not attributable to an act of the voter) shall comply with the error rate standards established under section 3.2.1 of the voting systems standards issued by the Federal Election Commission which are in effect on the date of the enactment of this Act. (HAVA is referencing the 2002 VVS.)
Section 3.2.1 of the 2002 VVS: Accuracy Requirements: Voting system accuracy addresses the accuracy of data for each of the individual ballot positions that could be selected by a voter, including the positions that are not selected. For a voting system, accuracy is defined as the ability of the system to capture, record, store, consolidate and report the specific selections and absence of selections, made by the voter for each ballot position without error. Required accuracy is defined in terms of an error rate that for testing purposes represents the maximum number of errors allowed while processing a specified volume of data. This rate is set at a sufficiently stringent level such that the likelihood of voting system errors affecting the outcome of an election is exceptionally remote even in the closest of elections. The error rate is defined using a convention that recognizes differences in how vote data is processed by different types of voting systems. Paper-based and DRE systems have different processing steps. Some differences also exist between precinct count and central count systems. Therefore, the acceptable error rate applies separately and distinctly to each of the following functions: a. For all paper-based systems: 1) Scanning ballot positions on paper ballots to detect selections for individual candidates and contests; (partial omission here) For each processing function indicated above, the system shall achieve a target error rate of no more than one in 10,000,000 ballot positions, with a maximum acceptable error rate in the test process of one in 500,000 ballot positions.
VIOLATION #3: The location of the memory cards post-election were reported "unknown".
Fact: According to election observers who spoke with Secretary Gardner during the recount, the location of memory cards used in the Primary Election on January 8th, 2008 was unknown. In conversations with observers he referenced the likelihood that town clerks/moderators had secured the cards but he was unaware of their exact location. Each memory card equates to an entire electronic ballot box. Ballots (which should include paper or electronic ballots) according to federal law must be preserved for 22 months following an election.
REMEDIAL ACTION: Since the memory cards are key to transparency, I request the State amend current procedures/statutes by creating a rigorous set of statutes regarding chain of custody for the memory cards, ballots and equipment as well as the memory card holders and workers, and further define how citizens can, in a timely manner, monitor the chain of custody and the content of said cards. I ask you to consider appropriate disciplinary actions, including felony or other charges to be filed against all persons whose responsibility it is to follow the laws pertaining to ballot retention but who failed to do so. One central location, through the Secretary of State, should be made responsible to account for all memory cards before, during, and after an election, and make those records available to the public in a timely manner if requested. CITATIONS: I believe this is an implicit responsibility. The security of the ballots is tantamount and it is understood that they should be safeguarded at all times. The memory cards, as has been stated elsewhere, are equivalent to a ballot box filled with ballots.
VIOLATION #4: The boxes of ballots were not picked up for the recounts by State Police.
Fact. A van driven by two state employees, followed by a state trooper, drove around to pick up boxes of ballots at the various jurisdictions throughout the state. Their transport in a van driven by two state employees is not the same as the ballots being in the custody of the State Police. Election observers following the vans observed them speeding at 85 and 90 mph in 55 mph zones; speeding through school zones with school zone lights flashing; going 45 and 50 mph in 25 and 35mph residential areas, and making obvious and successful attempts to "lose" the citizen observers. The observers were left to wonder what was being done with the unsecured ballots inside the van and during the times after the van successfully "lost" their vehicles.
See Exhibit C.
REMEDIAL ACTION: I request that in the future that state police do transport the boxes. If one additional state employee rides with the trooper to carry the boxes, the statute should direct him to be in sight of said trooper at all times, including when the vehicle is in motion. When the vehicle is traveling all troopers and/or trooper and other state employees must be in passenger seats, separated from the boxes of ballots. This will prevent any appearance of possible ballot tampering while the ballots are being transported. CITATIONS: 660:5 - Conduct of Recount. If directed by the secretary of state, the state police shall collect all ballots requested from the town or city clerks having custody of them and shall deliver them to the public facility designated by the secretary of state.
VIOLATION #5: Ballots were not stored and transported in boxes provided by the Secretary of State's office.
Fact: Boxes arrived at the State Archive Building for the recount in non-uniform boxes, with various methods of taping, many not properly sealed. One jurisdiction sent their ballots in bundles wrapped in newspaper. Others came wrapped in brown paper. Some boxes came with no tape. Many ballots were returned in the same boxes in which they were received from the printer/Secretary of State's office, but this led to some ambiguity about when and by whom openings in the boxes had been made.
See Exhibit D.
REMEDIAL ACTIONS REQUESTED: In the future, the boxes for transport of the ballots from the municipalities following an election, will in fact be different from the ones in which the ballots were delivered to the jurisdictions, to prevent any ambiguity about former openings in the boxes. The boxes should have no 'clutter' on them; and the boxes should be new, never used prior and be devoid of any writing other than instructions found in State Statutes (The New Hampshire government may take as many measures as possible to be frugal and mindful of expenditure of taxpayer money, but the additional boxes in this case would be a very small expenditure in the broad scheme of things and would go a long way to allay/prevent any suspicions, as well as to ensure security.) I am also requesting that the seals used on the boxes be of a more permanent nature where any unauthorized entry can be easily detected. In all future elections, I am requesting that the Office of the Secretary of State f ollow the statutes and procedures more closely regarding the conduct of elections. I also ask that greater scrutiny be paid by the Attorney General to all election and election recount operations. I would request that disciplinary consequences be mandated and enforced by the Secretary of State's office for any future violations of any current regulations, of any remedial measures requested in this Petition of Appeal, or other future regulations.
CITATIONS:
659:95 Sealing and Certifying Ballots. I. Immediately after the ballots cast at a state election have been tabulated and the result has been announced and the return has been made, the moderator or the moderator's designee, in the presence of the selectmen or their designee, shall place the cast, cancelled and uncase ballots, including such ballots from any additional polling places, and further including the successfully challenged absentee ballots still contained in their envelopes, in the containers provided by the secretary of state as required by RSA 659:97 and shall seal such container with the sealer provided by the secretary of state as required by RSA 659:97. The moderator or the moderator's designee shall then enter in the appropriate blanks on such sealer on each container the number of cast, cancelled and uncast ballots in such container and shall endorse in the appropriate place on such sealer a certificate in substance as follows: Enclosed are the ballots from the state election in the town of (or in ward____ in the city of ) held on ______, 200__ required by law to be preserved. The moderator and the selectmen or their designees shall sign their names in the appropriate blanks on the sealer.
659:97 Secretary of State to Prepare Containers, Sealers. The secretary of state shall, before any state election, prepare and distribute to each town and ward clerk containers to be used for preserving ballots and sealers to seal each such container. He shall prepare special containers and sealers to be used for preserving any special and separate ballots for questions to voters and shall prescribe the form of any endorsement blank printed upon the sealers provided that the blank is in substance consistent with the provisions of RSA 659:95.
VIOLATION #6: Many ballot boxes were not properly sealed, and what were referred to as "seals" would not safeguard the ballots from tampering.
Fact. "Seals" meant to secure the boxes were in fact "labels"; they did not stick securely to the boxes, could be easily removed and re-attached, and left no evidence of having been removed and reattached from the box on which they'd been placed. As such they were not "seals" to the boxes; in order for the ballots to be secure, real tape was needed to bind the boxes. Many ballot boxes were delivered to the State Archive Building for recounting with tops not secured and with slits in them large enough for a hand to fit through.
See Exhibit E.
REMEDIAL ACTION REQUESTED:. In all future elections, the Office of the Secretary of State would clearly regulate for the cities and towns the appropriate means of securing all boxes of ballots. The seals ordered in the future must indeed be seals that seal the boxes in an unequivocally secure manner; if such seals are removed from any box prior to the time of any recount, it must be easily apparent to all observers. In any future recounts where boxes are found not to comply, the entire election would be deemed invalid.
CITATIONS: 659:95 Sealing and Certifying Ballots, cited above 659:97 Secretary of State to Prepare Containers, Sealers. The secretary of state shall, before any state election, prepare and distribute to each town and ward clerk containers to be used for preserving ballots and sealers to seal each such container. He shall prepare special containers and sealers to be used for preserving any special and separate ballots for questions to voters. The secretary of state shall prescribe the size and form of such containers and sealers and shall prescribe the form of any endorsement blank printed upon the sealers provided that the blank is in substance consistent with the provisions of RSA 659:95.
VIOLATION #7: The uncounted ballots were not always kept overnight in the security of the "ballot vault."
Fact. At least on the night of the recount January 17 (and possibly other nights as well) boxes of uncounted ballots were not stored in the "vault" in the State Archive Building, but rather in the "counting room", which is not a secure room. Election observers heard Secretary Gardner claiming that the room was secure because he put one of the easily-removable and easily-restick-able "seals" (see #6 above) across each of the double door entries to the room. See Exhibit F.
REMEDIAL ACTION REQUESTED: New Hampshire could indeed lead the nation as an example of chain of custody security. Much is already in place. I ask you to consider adding some statutes that cover every aspect of the "chain of custody" of the ballots, such that every stage of the "chain of custody" is explicitly spelled out by future statute. These statutes would in turn be distributed to every office employee of the Secretary of State, to every city and town clerk and selectperson, to the state police, and to every other person involved in said chain of custody. Such future regulations must be complied with to the fullest degree. We recommend that you consider adding penalties and charges for any violations to every chain of custody statute. I feel it is important and critical to any democratic election that every step of the chain of custody of ballots, software, hardware and voting equipment be open to citizen scrutiny and observation. I am hopeful that you would also consider requiring all election officials to keep a log of every time any employee or outside companies such as LHS work on and/or make any changes to any aspect of the system. Ideally, cameras should be set up to be on the ballot boxes at all times and broadcast election day events live over the internet for citizens to oversee. (This could be extended to include the counting procedures as well.) Such a system -- and New Hampshire has much of it already in place -- would exemplify a secure chain of custody of ballots and of all related election materials that must be protected. The security of the ballots is tantamount and it is understood that they should be safeguarded at all times.
VIOLATION #8: Ballots were not always delivered in an open and public manner.
Fact. On many days of the recount, ballots were delivered after the recount had ended for the day, after dark, when most of the employees were gone from the building, and their delivery was not witnessed by any member of the public or citizen monitors.
See Exhibit G.
REMEDIAL ACTION REQUESTED: Same as # 7 above.
CITATIONS. Same as # 7 above.
WEAKNESSES IDENTIFIED: In the process of analyzing the recount and election procedures, I have identified the following two items as " weaknesses" in current procedure:
1. The candidate in a recount cannot get access to all the different categories of ballots: Cast,. Spoiled, Blank, Uncast.It's critical for the integrity of the process that the candidate be ale to acct for the total number of all ballots in each category
Remedy: Either we have to adjust the recount procedure so that the uncast ballots are NOT excempt from Right to Know requests, OR have the Right to Know requests for all of these categories of ballots honored immediately upon submission of request.
2. There are inconsistencies in the execution of some election and recount protocols. We would like to be able to examine the actions and responsibilities of each Assistant and Deputy Secretary of State in order to determine which party is responsible for each step of the election and recount process. To reiterate: Petitioner is proud to be an American when witnessing the organized, orderly, open and communal vote-counting process as executed in New Hampshire. Unfortunately, I also observed some gaps in ballot security and understand the vulnerabilities of the machines used in vote tabulation. I submit this petition with the desire and the belief that with a little attention and a few statutes addressing such things as ballot security and chain of custody, we can close those gaps. New Hampshire will be first in the nation to hold its Presidential Primary and it will be first in the nation in this century to have elections with observability, accountability, checks and balances, and real transparency.
The Ballot Law Commission's rules places the burden of proof on the Petitioner for any and all complaints and allegations. Yet, it is impossible to completely fulfill the "burden of proof" obligation when the State refuses to provide me in a timely fashion with requested election data through the "Right to Know" law, and without giving me sufficient time to review the requested data prior to filing this petition within the three day period as required by law.
I am therefore requesting that the Secretary of State provide me with copies of all the data I have requested (on January 14, 2008 and February 1, 2008) from him and from LHS through the New Hampshire "Right to Know"; that I be given 14 days to review this data once received; and that I be allowed to re-file this petition if I so desire and to add additional violations and/or Exhibits if applicable.
As required by RSA 665:6, I am filing these Complaints today, February 15, 2008.
We have collected over 20 hours of video taken by six different people. It will tell much of the story of the New Hampshire recount.
After some thought, I think the best way to do this is with as little editing as possible, to allow viewers to reach their own conclusions based on what they see. I will organize clips into uniform topics and will keep them short, with a few captions to provide context.
Links will appear on the Black Box Voting home page. For those of you who receive automatic e-mails, I'll post an announcement with a link when each new video goes up.
While Gardner may win the prize for the most circuitous and nonresponsive answers, ballot guy David Scanlan will win the award for belligerence.
The New Hampshire Chain of Custody Sham
I posted this one first because I was so haunted by New Hampshire Secretary of State Bill Gardner's demeanor and the expression on his face on the night he chose not to put the ballots in the vault. This 6-minute video contains three related clips: Frank Mevers, who holds a key to the ballot vaults, describing that the white tape seals the boxes; Sec. State Bill Gardner along with Frank Mevers, Brian Burford and Karen Ladd, as he is questioned about the decision not to use the vault; and a demonstration of the sham seal.
Here it is
Participants
The first voice you hear, questioning Mevers about the seal, is that of Paddy Shaffer of the Ohio Election Justice Project.
The voice questioning Bill Gardner over the decision not to use the vault is mine. The voice telling him he did not answer the question is Sally Castleman of Election Defense Alliance.
Susan Pynchon (Florida Fair Elections Coalition) and I chased the ballot van on Jan. 17; on Jan. 22, Vickie Karp (Vote Rescue) and I chased the van, and on Jan. 23, due to speeding and evasive maneuvers by the ballot van, two teams followed the van with video cameras: Team one, Vickie Karp and Jeannie Dean (Sarasota, Florida); Team Two, me and Kathy Greenwell (Bullitt County, Kentucky.)
How we came to find ballot boxes and a supply box containing unused "seals"
We returned to the archive building to wait for Butch and Hoppy to return the ballots they'd picked up. We were shocked to see that the building appeared to be deserted, but was unlocked, and the counting room was unlocked, and contained empty ballot boxes and a supply box with seals, tape etc.
For the benefit of the police
In order to determine whether there were ballots in the boxes or not, I gently nudged the boxes with my shoe. The light weight indicated the ballot boxes were empty. At least one ballot box, for the town of Plaistow, contained the original sham seal signed by the moderator and selectmen. It was empty.
It was my decision to demonstrate the sham seals on videotape. I will be happy to reimburse the state of New Hampshire for the $1 or so cost for the sham "seal", since I used a blank seal on an empty box. Of course, as you will see in the video above, these seals are reusable, worthless, and fraudulent.
I would not have performed the demonstration had the state of New Hampshire complied with my requests to show me whether the seals adhere. I requested this of Deputy Sec. State Anthony Stevens, of Assistant Sec. State Dave Scanlan, and of Sec. State Bill Gardner. They each declined to demonstrate the removability of the seal, but did claim that the removable paper "sealed" the ballot boxes and amazingly, used the fraudulent "seal" to secure the DOOR TO THE ROOM WHERE BALLOTS WERE STORED OVERNIGHT. My demonstration was the only way to achieve the exposure of their lies, and clearly in the public interest.
The police interrogated Vickie Karp and Jeannie Dean today about this. They were not involved. The decision to demonstrate the "seal" fraud was mine and only mine.
I have so far been unable to find out who ordered these seals, since not a soul at the New Hampshire secretary of state's office claims to know who's responsible for the fraudulent seals.
Upcoming video clips
As I say, stay tuned for the video clips. They show employees for the state of New Hampshire breaking the law, and also will show you tips for how to investigate chain of custody yourselves.
Check back often over the next three days for new video installments.
New Hampshire's primary delivered a "surprise" upset victory to Senator Hillary Clinton, contradicting all pre-election poll predictions and even the facts on the ground, which showed Senator Obama with a strong lead and enthusiastic overflow crowds at every New Hampshire appearance.
Political pundits in the corporate media and citizen journalists in the Blogosphere alike are all asking the same question: What happened in New Hampshire?
It's pretty easy to see what happened in New Hampshire: We had an election for which 81% of our ballots were counted in secret by a private corporation, and this resulted in an outcome that is called into question.
That's what happened.
No recount is going to change this. What will change this is to get rid of corporate controlled secret vote counting in our elections.
New Hampshire holds exemplary elections in 45% of our polling places; elections where our paper ballots are counted by hand by our neighbors in full public view with 100% citizen oversight and checks and balances. These hand count elections, of which New Hampshire is the "hands down" expert, provide the only method known today that can guarantee open and honest elections. These are elections where every ballot, every vote, every mark made by the voter, is observed and tallied in full public view with multiple sets of eyes watching and checking and balancing each count.
New Hampshire already knows how to fix this problem. For the past four years, New Hampshire citizens have been asking the State to fix this problem, but the State has thus far refused. We don't need a recount now. What we need now is for the State to reconsider and implement procedural and legislative solutions to guarantee open and honest elections.
A recount won't provide any significant benefit to the cause of free and fair and open elections. Bringing back full citizen oversight and checks and balances to all New Hampshire elections is the only way to avoid having any more questionable election outcomes in the Granite State.
Beginning with our state Founders, civil rights activists have been fighting for open elections as the mechanism to protect our freedom and democracy. The New Hampshire Constitution mandates we sort and count our votes in open meeting. The New Hampshire Right to Know law, citing our Constitution, declares that the government derives its power from the people and therefore all government processes and information must be fully accessible to the people.
The United States Bill of Rights similarly asserts that the government derives its power from the people, who have the right to "alter or abolish" said government if it fails to act in our favor. Our right to "alter or abolish" peacefully comes through open and honest elections.
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 mandates observable vote counting.
But despite this long history of grassroots activism in support of free and open elections, New Hampshire has turned the majority of our elections into privatized affairs with no citizen oversight whatsoever.
Now activists around the nation are calling for a recount. In New Hampshire the manual recount has always been held as justification for holding elections in which more than 80% of our ballots are counted in secret by private corporations.
Does this logic hold up? Will a recount rectify the problem before us?
I say no. The problem before us is that we have outsourced the most precious thing in our democracy: the counting of our votes. And in New Hampshire, we have outsourced more than 80% of our votes to a private corporation counting those votes in secret, and, as it turns out, that private corporation has a convicted drug trafficker on its executive team to boot. A recount does not solve this problem.
Proponents and apologists of the privatized and computerized corporate elections often justify computerized elections saying how "easy" it is to corrupt a hand count election. They say, "But you can always swap out the ballots to get the count you want!"
And they are 100% correct about this. But only when there is no citizen oversight. And the only time this happens in a hand count election is in a recount.
In the Election Night count, the first count, the count that matters, all hand count elections have complete citizen oversight as a check against the kind of corrupt outcome you would find in a ballot swapping affair. But in a recount, there is absolutely no citizen oversight for the entire time between Election Night and the recount itself.
If we are going to assume the possibility that some nefarious super spy has bothered to rig a New Hampshire election, wouldn't we assume they have also taken into account our liberal recount laws? Wouldn't we assume they might have a Plan B to ensure a recount validates their nefarious doings? Is it at all logical that evildoers who find their way into our machine counts might not also find a way into our recounts?
Open and honest elections require citizen oversight. This is a simple thing to accomplish in a hand count Election Night count. But in a recount it is impossible.
In a recount, citizens have no control over the ballot chain of custody. Unless citizens have stood guard over every ballot box from the moment that it was sealed and signed by our local election officials, the recount provides no more assurance than the machine counts. A recount of a secret computerized vote count is just another weak link in the chain of publicly observable ballot custody required for honest and open elections.
In 2004, on request from citizen activists, candidate Ralph Nader had a New Hampshire recount. Only 11 districts, chosen by a mysterious out of state activist, claiming to be a statistician who had found anomalies in the results, were recounted. New Hampshire officials at the time disagreed with her interpretation but the recount occurred as she directed. To nobody's surprise, the recounts uncovered no significant discrepancies, and New Hampshire's system of corporate controlled secret vote counting got a big stamp of approval.
And here we are again. Another corporate controlled New Hampshire election. Another questionable outcome. Did the Nader recount change things for the better? Did it resolve the problem?
If New Hampshire conducts a recount now, it's as reasonable as not to assume this recount will again not reveal any significant discrepancies. Our corporate controlled secret vote count elections will be validated, and we will continue to have elections whose outcomes can not be trusted.
It is time for real accountability and change. We get this not from a recount, but from an investigation. We need questions asked and answered, and changes made so we have a clean election in the Granite State in November 2008, and in every election thereafter.
The first question that needs to be asked is: Why did the NH Ballot Law Commission approve this voting equipment in March 2006 when the vendor himself testified it was defective and after citizens testified for more than four hours against the approval?
Second question: Why did the State not respond to citizen requests for a rehearing after California decertified the same equipment we are using in New Hampshire?
Third question: Why has every citizen request for risk mitigation through reasonable procedural changes and legislation been ignored or obstructed by the State?
Fourth question: Why did the legislature, in two separate sessions under both Republican and Democratic majority, kill legislation that called for full software disclosure for voting equipment?
Fifth question: Why did the legislature kill a bill calling for voting machine approval only if those machines can guarantee the integrity of election results?
Sixth question: Why did the legislature kill a bill calling for election night parallel hand count of a percent of ballots to check and balance against the machine count? Why did the State refuse to make this a recommended procedure for every machine count polling place?
Seventh question: Why did the State do nothing after hearing testimony from internationally recognized computer security experts suggesting recommendations for risk mitigation procedures?
Eighth question: Why did the State, after hearing from the Diebold representative in September 2007 that more secure firmware was available, not insist on having that firmware tested and installed in time for our Primary?
Ninth question: Did the State have any prior knowledge that an executive in the firm programming our elections is a convicted drug trafficker, and does the State think this is appropriate for a firm handling such sensitive state data as our votes?
Once those questions are asked, the very last question must be: What changes will the State implement for November's election so voters can believe in the results?
The days of the status quo are over. The New Hampshire recount, a valuable check and balance for free and open elections, is useless in the face of possible high stakes election tampering. Using the recount to justify secret vote counting is just part of the status quo.
We need an honest and open first count on Election Night, and that will happen only with structural change, not a recount.
originally posted at: http://www.democracyfornewhamp...
There's something about the process of walking up to the table and announcing your name, collecting your ballot then stepping into the little "booth" that feels empowering to me. Here I am, taking the time to be counted. Someone, somewhere is taking note of what I think. I am contributing to the continuation of a process that has made America great. I love my country!
Here's a list of questions that both new and experienced voters may have about the voting process. I'm a poll worker, so these are educated - though not official - answers. Where I can, I point to official stuff, though. (I've also tried to mark my partisan commentary in italics to separate it from statements of accepted law.)
Clicking on a hot-linked question will bring you to a comment that addresses it. Then click the browser 'Back' button to return here.
Here's a list of questions that both new and experienced voters may have about the voting process. I'm a poll worker, so these are educated - though not official - answers. Where I can, I point to official stuff, though. (I've also tried to mark my partisan commentary in italics to separate it from statements of accepted law.)
Clicking on a hot-linked question will bring you to the comment in the thread below that addresses it. Then you can click the browser 'Back' button to return here.
I'll try to answer any questions. But Tuesday, I'll be gone all day: registering and/or checking in voters.
On Christmas Day, like most of you, I was enjoying the holiday having dinner with my family eating good food and listening to the conversation. Because this is New Hampshire, it wasn't surprising that the main topic of conversation was the NH Primary and how much of a pain it was to everyone. "I am so sick and tied of all of these damn phone calls," my Uncle said. "It's these damn television commercials, said a cousin why can't they leave us in peace." I'm not going to vote in this damn thing anyway, my vote doesn't matter and I have too much to do to be bothered," said another.
I should point out that this isn't just members of my family who have become turned off by the electoral process; I fear that this is the attitude of the majority of population. You see Americans take Democracy as a given and view voting as a nascence. All you have to do to see this is look at the at U.S. voting patterns over the last few years. In the 2004 Presidential Election, more than 78 million resisted voters took the time to vote. This was actually a heavy turnout, the most active election since 1968. In other words because of the non-voters, President Bush was elected by 30.8% of registered voters. In the 2004 Presidential Primaries, only 6.6% of registered Republicans voted as opposed to 11.4% of Democrats. In the 2004 New Hampshire Democratic Primary, 23.5% of registered Democrats voted, much better than the average turn out.
So how can we encourage citizens to vote? In the last few days, there have been two news stories that show what some people will give to support free elections.
On December 27, 2007, Kenyans went to the polls to vote in their Presidential election. Kenya is a poor country with few cars and poor public transportation. In order to vote they have to walk for miles in hot arid conditions to find a polling place. Once you reach the polls, they may find line up to a mile long of Kenyans determined to vote. According to BBC reports, more than 70% of eligible voters will vote in this election. Terry Ombaka, a musician who waited in line for more than eight hours said, "I'd rather die than not vote. A farmer named Mary Muthoni Gikiri said, "I have not even milked my cow because today we are putting our country first!" How many American voters have this kind of dedication to the Democratic process?
On December 27, 2007, Pakistani Presidential candidate, Benazir Bhutto was killed by an assassin as she left an election rally. Regardless how you feel about Mrs. Bhutto's politics, you have to admire her bravery and dedication to the electoral process. Her death did not come as a surprise as there had been assassination attempts in the past and intelligence indicated that she had been targeted. Regardless she continued to campaign refusing to give in to extremists. Bhutto gave her life to the electoral process, can't we make out own contribution to the process and just get up off our asses and vote?
I would like to challenge everyone reading this blog to go out and get ten friends to vote. With the amount of TV commercials and mailings I think that just about everyone knows the candidates and the issues; they just need to get to the polls and vote.
Today while i watched Chuck and Larry teh Movie, i remembered why i'm voting for Obama. So many years of fighting for what? So that we can be free and be consider humans and be treaty with dignity is this too much to ask. Sometimes i ask myself why Republicans have to act like this with so much hatred or unjuste to the gay community did we ever did something bad to them? What ever it is Im proud to be a Democrat, and not jsut a democrat also a Gay American. The reason i speak with so much pride and write with so much pride is ebcause Obama remind me that no matter whta the Republicans say there is still Hopa in the USA. If you haven't watch this movie. Please do is funny and also great and inspiring.
Obama will give us what we need to be again THE UNITED STATES of AMERICA!
IIRC, early binding and late binding are software engineering terms.
A compiler (e.g., for C++) uses early binding. That means that the association between a variable such as ScreenWidth and a location in the computer's memory is determined once, when the program is compiled, and remembered every time the program is run.
An interpreter (e.g., Visual Basic) uses late binding. It figures out just where ScreenWidth is stored in memory every time the program runs. There is no compile step.
